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ABSTRACT 
  Courts and advocates alike have struggled to articulate a coherent 
rule regarding when the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA) should apply to local governments’ land-use 
decisions. When it is applied too broadly, RLUIPA runs roughshod 
over the ability of state and local governments to control their own 
land-use patterns, and it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment and federalism precedents. When applied too narrowly, 
RLUIPA fails to provide a remedy for victims of religious 
discrimination. This Note explains the legally cognizable—but 
previously unrecognized—differences between the types of land-use 
decisions that local governments make, and it argues that RLUIPA 
should apply to individualized assessments, such as use permits and 
variances, but that RLUIPA should not apply to generalized 
assessments, such as requests for zoning-ordinance amendments. This 
Note uses two recent Ninth Circuit cases—one of which would have 
been decided differently if the court had used the proposed 
distinction—to illustrate how an analysis of individualized and 
generalized assessments would work in practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel 
(ICFG) entered into a contract to purchase property in San Leandro, 
California, that it believed would suit its growing congregation.1 
Several weeks later, church officials met with city staff, who informed 
the ICFG that the property was located in an industrial zoning 
district, which did not permit any type of assembly use, including 
churches.2 After the city denied the church’s requests to amend the 
city’s zoning ordinance, the ICFG sued the city, alleging three claims 
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000 (RLUIPA)3 and six constitutional claims.4 The district court 
granted the city’s motion for summary judgment on all claims,5 
expressing concern that “[c]arried to its logical conclusion, [the 
ICFG’s] argument would ultimately exempt religious assemblies (as 
opposed to other entities) from the requirement of complying with 
any zoning regulation, regardless of how neutrally applied.”6 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the city’s consideration of the 
ICFG’s requests was within the scope of RLUIPA and reversed the 
district court on two of the ICFG’s RLUIPA claims.7 The appellate 
court remanded the case, holding that the city failed to articulate a 
compelling reason for its denial of the ICFG’s requests.8 
Despite the district court’s warning, the Ninth Circuit articulated 
no limiting principles to its holding in International Church of the 
Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro.9 Additionally, its 
application of RLUIPA to San Leandro’s denial of the ICFG’s 
rezoning requests suffers from three major flaws. First, the decision 
rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what a request to amend 
a zoning ordinance actually entails. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
 
 1. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 632 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930 
(N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 931–32. 
 3. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 
Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)). 
 4. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 935–36. 
 5. Id. at 946. 
 6. Id. at 943. 
 7. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). 
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erred when it determined that San Leandro’s consideration of the 
ICFG’s rezoning requests constituted an individualized assessment, 
which is subject to RLUIPA. Instead, it should have found that San 
Leandro’s consideration of the ICFG’s requests was a generalized 
assessment, which should fall outside the scope of the statute. Second, 
the Ninth Circuit’s construction of RLUIPA fails to comport with 
both Supreme Court precedent regarding the Free Exercise Clause 
and Congress’s Section 5 enforcement authority conferred by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the Ninth Circuit’s holding threatens 
to undermine the federal-state balance in which the regulation of land 
use has been a “traditional state power,”10 “the quintessential state 
activity,”11 and “a function traditionally performed by local 
governments.”12 The Ninth Circuit’s decision thus enables a massive 
federal intrusion into an area of law that, as recognized in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,13 
traditionally has been reserved to the states.14 
RLUIPA is Congress’s second attempt to establish strict scrutiny 
for local land-use decisions made when the applicant is a religious 
institution.15 This goal is not entirely misguided; robust judicial 
deference to local control has sometimes come at the expense of the 
rights of minorities or the poor.16 Indeed, even Justice Sutherland’s 
opinion in Euclid contains discriminatory language17 that would 
offend the sensibilities of the many modern urban planners who are 
 
 10. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 
(2001). 
 11. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1983). 
 12. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994). 
 13. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 14. See id. at 397 (1926) (upholding the general power of local governments to pass zoning 
ordinances). Although this Note focuses on California, its main argument—that courts may 
apply RLUIPA only to individualized assessments of land uses—is applicable in any jurisdiction 
that uses Euclidian zoning. 
 15. The Supreme Court declared Congress’s first attempt, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997)), to be in part beyond the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 16. See generally DAVID M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE 
RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2007) (detailing how local organizations enabled 
and enforced racial segregation in housing from the 1920s through the 1970s). 
 17. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394 (“[V]ery often the apartment house is a mere parasite, 
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created 
by the residential character of the district.”). 
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“dedicated to advancing the art, science and profession of good 
planning—physical, economic and social—to create communities that 
offer better choices for where and how people work and live.”18 A 
heightened consciousness of how land-use planning historically has 
been used as a tool for discrimination led Congress to enact statutes 
aimed at ensuring that municipalities use their extensive land-use 
power for legitimate ends.19 
This Note offers a reading of RLUIPA that rests on the 
fundamental and legally cognizable differences between the 
individualized assessments that local governments conduct when 
considering land-use requests, such as use permits, and the 
generalized assessments that local governments conduct when 
considering requests to amend zoning ordinances. By its own terms, 
RLUIPA does not apply to generalized assessments, and this Note’s 
proposed reading of the statute is the best and most plausible 
construction because it avoids the constitutional problems raised by 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in San Leandro. First, this proposed 
reading renders RLUIPA consistent with Supreme Court precedent 
regarding the scope of Congress’s Section 5 power to enforce the Free 
Exercise Clause. Second, it strikes the appropriate federal-state 
balance in an area of regulation that traditionally has been reserved 
to the states. Third, it preserves RLUIPA for cases in which 
governments conduct individualized assessments, cases in which 
arbitrary or discriminatory denials of land-use requests may be more 
likely. 
To illustrate these arguments, this Note compares San Leandro 
to another Ninth Circuit RLUIPA case from 2006, Guru Nanak Sikh 
Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter.20 In Guru Nanak, the 
religious institution sought and, on two separate occasions, was 
denied a use permit to construct a temple in the unincorporated area 
of Sutter County, California.21 Under California’s land-use and 
planning statutes, a use permit is procedurally and substantively 
distinct from the rezoning applications that were at issue in San 
 
 18. About Planning, AM. PLANNING ASS’N, http://www.planning.org/aboutplanning (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2012). 
 19. For example, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006)), protects the buyers and renters of real 
estate from discriminatory practices. 
 20. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 21. Id. at 982. 
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Leandro.22 The individualized assessment conducted by Sutter County 
was not the same as the generalized assessment conducted by San 
Leandro. Had the Ninth Circuit recognized this important difference 
between the cases, it would have reached a different conclusion in 
San Leandro and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the city. 
This Note provides a new and principled way for courts to 
analyze whether a local land-use decision is subject to RLUIPA.23 
Part I discusses the background of RLUIPA and the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding the Free Exercise Clause and Congress’s 
Section 5 enforcement authority. Part II contains a summary of 
zoning ordinances in general and California land-use law in 
particular. Part III explains the differences between Guru Nanak and 
San Leandro. Part IV proposes a construction of RLUIPA and 
describes why the Ninth Circuit was correct in Guru Nanak but 
incorrect in San Leandro. Part V describes several constitutional 
problems with the Ninth Circuit’s reading of RLUIPA in San 
Leandro, problems that are avoided by construing RLUIPA based on 
the distinction between individualized and generalized assessments. 
I.  THE ROAD TO RLUIPA 
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause states, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”24 In Sherbert v. Verner,25 the 
Supreme Court held that any state action that substantially burdens 
the free exercise of religion would be subject to strict scrutiny.26 The 
 
 22. For a discussion of the differences between use permits and rezoning applications, see 
infra Part II.B. 
 23. Additionally, this Note helps to resolve the circuit split regarding the application of 
RLUIPA. Compare Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 
275–77 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that applying a neutral, generally applicable law does not 
constitute an individualized assessment within the scope of RLUIPA), and Civil Liberties for 
Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir. 2003) (same), with Int’l Church 
of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir.) (holding that 
any case-by-case assessment of a land-use proposal is subject to RLUIPA), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 251 (2011), and Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (same). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s authority to 
enforce the Free Exercise Clause through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment since 1940. 
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The fundamental concept of liberty 
embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.”). 
 25. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 26. Id. at 404. 
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Court defined “substantial burden” as something that requires one to 
“choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting 
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion . . . on the other hand.”27 
Nearly thirty years later, however, in Employment Division v. 
Smith,28 the Supreme Court applied rational basis review rather than 
strict scrutiny to a substantial burden imposed by government on the 
exercise of religion. The Court concluded that the State of Oregon 
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause when it denied 
unemployment benefits to two men who were fired for ingesting an 
illegal drug, notwithstanding the fact that the men had ingested the 
drug during a religious ceremony.29 The Supreme Court drew an 
important distinction between engaging in religious conduct that is 
permitted by law and engaging in religious conduct that is prohibited 
by law.30 The Court stated that “[i]t is a permissible reading of the 
text . . . to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the 
object . . . but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision [of a law], the First Amendment has not 
been offended.”31 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia went on to 
say that “more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence 
contradicts” the proposition “that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting 
conduct that the State is free to regulate.”32 
Smith divided free-exercise jurisprudence into two lines. The pre-
Smith line—in which courts apply strict scrutiny and typified by cases 
such as Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,33 Thomas v. 
Review Board,34 and Sherbert—still applies when the government 
substantially burdens religious exercise “where the State has in place 
a system of individual exemptions” and refuses “to extend that system 
 
 27. Id. In spite of the test that the Court applied in Sherbert, the level of scrutiny applied to 
free-exercise claims was not always clear. See Garrett Epps, The Story of Al Smith: The First 
Amendment Meets Grandfather Peyote, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 455, 455 (Michael C. 
Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) (“For years, the Court[] . . . was unclear, although language in the Warren 
and Burger Courts’ opinions suggested that the Constitution required government to show a 
‘compelling interest.’”). 
 28. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 29. Id. at 886–90.  
 30. Id. at 876. 
 31. Id. at 878. 
 32. Id. at 878–79. 
 33. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
 34. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
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to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”35 But 
when the substantial burden is imposed incidental to a law of general 
applicability, Smith dictates that courts apply rational basis review.36 
The Court’s decision in Smith surprised many observers and 
caused “a nationwide outcry by religious groups across the political 
and theological spectrum.”37 In response, Congress adopted the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)38 by a nearly 
unanimous vote.39 RFRA stated that “[g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless the application 
of the regulation] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling interest.”40 In adopting RFRA, Congress found that 
in Employment Division v. Smith . . . the Supreme Court virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on 
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; 
and . . . the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court 
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between 
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.41 
Congress stated that its purpose in enacting RFRA was “to restore 
the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its application in all 
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”42 
Four years after Congress enacted RFRA, the Supreme Court 
was squarely presented with the task of deciding the statute’s 
constitutionality in City of Boerne v. Flores.43 In Boerne, the Catholic 
Archbishop of San Antonio sued the City of Boerne under RFRA 
after the city refused to grant a church a permit to expand one of its 
buildings when the expansion would have violated the city’s historic-
 
 35. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883–84 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
 36. E.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 273 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
 37. Epps, supra note 27, at 455–56. 
 38. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), invalidated in part by City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 39. Epps, supra note 27, at 477; see also 139 CONG. REC. 9687, 26,416 (1993) (noting that 
the bill passed by a voice vote in the House and a 97-3 vote in the Senate). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994). 
 41. Id. § 2000bb(a)(4)–(5). 
 42. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
 43. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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preservation ordinance.44 The Court responded by holding that 
RFRA exceeded Congress’s enforcement authority under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 The Court stated that “[w]hile 
preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there 
must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be 
achieved.”46 RFRA, the Court determined, “cannot be considered 
remedial, preventive legislation” and was therefore unconstitutional.47 
Boerne thus represents a strong defense of states’ rights relative to 
Congress’s Section 5 power.48 
In 2000, Congress responded to the Boerne decision by enacting 
RLUIPA.49 RLUIPA did three significant things that RFRA did not. 
First, RLUIPA is confined to two subject areas: land use and 
institutionalized persons.50 Second, RLUIPA includes two additional 
jurisdictional hooks: a Spending Clause hook51 and a Commerce 
Clause hook.52 Third, Congress drafted the Section 5 hook in a way 
that responds directly to language from Boerne, wherein Justice 
Kennedy distinguished Boerne and Smith from the Sherbert line of 
free-exercise cases. In Boerne, Justice Kennedy had written: 
 
 44. Id. at 512. 
 45. Id. at 511. The Supreme Court repeatedly cited Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137 (1803), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), perhaps in an effort to 
remind Congress that “the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers . . . [and] that the 
‘powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or 
forgotten, the constitution is written,’” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) at 176). 
 46. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. 
 47. Id. at 532. 
 48. Epps, supra note 27, at 479. 
 49. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-274, 114 
Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)). 
 50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006) (concerning land use for religious exercise); id. § 2000cc-1 
(concerning exercise of religion by institutionalized persons). Limiting RLUIPA to these two 
categories may have been in response to the Supreme Court’s statements in Boerne denouncing 
the breadth of RFRA: “RFRA is not so confined. Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at 
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every 
description and regardless of subject matter.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. In 2005, the Supreme 
Court rejected a facial challenge to the constitutionality of RLUIPA under the Establishment 
Clause. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724–25 (2005). 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (“This subsection applies in any case in which (A) the 
substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance, 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . .”). 
 52. See id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (“This subsection applies in any case in which . . . (B) the 
substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with 
foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from 
a rule of general applicability . . . .”). 
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Those cases [that impose a strict scrutiny test] . . . stand for ‘the 
proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual 
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 
religious hardship without compelling reason.’ By contrast, where a 
general prohibition, such as Oregon’s, is at issue, ‘the sounder 
approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our 
precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to [free exercise] 
challenges.’ Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws may 
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a 
compelling governmental interest.53 
RLUIPA’s Section 5 hook states that the Act applies when a 
“substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use 
regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a 
government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or 
practices that permit the government to make, individualized 
assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.”54 By 
using the phrase “individualized assessments,”55 Congress attempted 
to equate land-use decisions with the “individual exemptions”56 that 
continue to trigger strict scrutiny after Smith.57 But an assessment is 
 
 53. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 874, 884–85 (1990)). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Because neither Guru Nanak nor San 
Leandro reached the question of whether the municipality’s land-use decision fell within the 
scope of RLUIPA pursuant to either the Spending Clause or the Commerce Clause, this Note 
focuses exclusively on RLUIPA’s Section 5 hook. Spending Clause jurisprudence suggests that a 
municipality receiving federal funds for its land-use planning would be required to comply with 
RLUIPA. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (recognizing that to fall within the 
Spending Clause power, “conditions on federal grants” must, among other things, relate “to the 
federal interest in particular national projects or programs”). The analysis would be less 
straightforward if the municipality received federal funds for a program only tangentially 
related to its land-use planning, such as for community policing. An analysis of the 
constitutionality of RLUIPA under the Commerce Clause could involve inquiring whether the 
regulated activity—the imposition of a substantial burden on religious exercise from a rule of 
general applicability—substantially affects interstate commerce or whether the regulated 
activity is economic or noneconomic in nature. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 
(1995) (discussing “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce”). See generally 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (discussing the economic/noneconomic 
dichotomy). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). 
 56. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993) 
(“As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a general 
requirement are available, the government ‘may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 
religious hardship without compelling reason.’” (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 57. For example, in a statement issued prior to the passage of RLUIPA, Senators Orrin 
Hatch and Ted Kennedy stated that “the land use provisions of this bill satisfy the constitutional 
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not the same thing as an exemption. An exemption is “[f]reedom 
from a duty, liability, or other requirement.”58 RLUIPA does not 
define “assessment” or “individualized assessment,” and Black’s Law 
Dictionary provides no on-point definition. It is reasonable to 
conclude, however, that Congress intended the term to have its 
ordinary dictionary meaning of “the act of assessing; appraisal; 
evaluation.”59 This definition would encompass decisions about 
whether to grant an exemption to religious institutions from 
otherwise generally applicable rules, decisions that, presumably, 
would still be subject to strict scrutiny following Smith and Boerne.  
Courts that broadly apply RLUIPA to every land-use decision 
ignore the fact that RLUIPA, by its own terms, applies only to 
individualized assessments. Although a broad reading of RLUIPA 
may eliminate discrimination by providing a federal cause of action to 
religious institutions, it does so at a high cost. RLUIPA reaches 
deeply into state land-use law and local land-use decisions by 
requiring municipalities to articulate a compelling reason for applying 
an otherwise-valid and generally applicable system of land-use 
regulations. Because understanding land-use law is critical to 
understanding RLUIPA and its associated jurisprudence, the 
following Part contains a general discussion of land-use law and a 
closer examination of California land-use law. 
II.  A LAND-USE LAW PRIMER 
A. Land-Use Law and Zoning Generally 
In the 1920s, zoning began to replace nuisance law and private 
restrictive covenants as the primary way to avoid conflicts between 
 
standard [of Section 5] legally.” 146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch 
and Kennedy). They went on to explain that “[w]here government makes such individualized 
assessments, permitting some uses and excluding others, it cannot exclude religious uses without 
compelling justification.” Id. The senators cited Babalu Aye and Smith to support their 
assertion. Id. But Smith did not involve an individualized assessment, it concerned a request for 
an exemption from a generally applicable law. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. In 
Babalu Aye, the individualized assessment that the Court found objectionable was the city’s 
evaluation of the reasons motivating the slaughter of animals. Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 538–39. 
Thus, even if a land-use assessment is individualized and not generalized, the Babalu Aye test 
would not preclude a city from disapproving the construction of a religious facility, so long as 
the disapproval was based on an assessment of the land-use impacts, as opposed to an 
assessment of the religious motivations behind the conduct of constructing the facility. 
 58. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 653 (9th ed. 2009). 
 59. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 75 (2005). 
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users of land.60 Like all land-use regulations, zoning is an application 
of the police power, which is “the power of the states and their 
legislatures to enact regulations over persons and property to prohibit 
all things inimical to their citizens’ health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare.”61 The police power is reserved generally to the states62 and 
functions pursuant to each state’s constitution.63 Municipalities, such 
as cities and counties, are creatures of the states and may only 
exercise power granted by the state government.64 Therefore, 
municipal zoning powers must be derived from a state policy 
explicitly conferring such authority.65 
In 1924, the United States Department of Commerce developed 
the Standard Zoning Enabling Act66 to serve as a model for states that 
wished to delegate land-use authority to their municipalities.67 Since 
then, every state has adopted a statewide zoning-enabling act that 
delegates land-use regulatory authority to municipalities and other 
planning agencies.68 Following the Supreme Court’s 1926 decision in 
Euclid, municipalities across the United States have adopted zoning 
ordinances, including every large city—with the exception of 
Houston69—and the majority of smaller cities and localities.70 Zoning 
 
 60. BARLOW BURKE, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 
75 (2d ed. 2009). 
 61. Id. at 3. 
 62. Id. at 3–4. 
 63. Id. at 7. 
 64. The Supreme Court affirmed this state-municipal relationship in Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), when it said that “[m]unicipal corporations are political 
subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental 
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them,” id. at 178. Nonetheless, many states have 
amended their constitutions to allow cities to adopt a charter to partially exempt themselves 
from the tight legislative control described by Dillon’s Rule. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5. 
Moreover, charter cities in California are granted autonomy only over municipal affairs as 
opposed to matters of statewide concern, and the line between municipal affairs and matters of 
statewide concern may change over time. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Los 
Angeles, 812 P.2d 916, 924 (Cal. 1991) (“We have said that the task of determining whether a 
given activity is a ‘municipal affair’ or one of statewide concern is an ad hoc inquiry; that ‘the 
constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed or static quantity’ . . . .” (quoting Pac. 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 336 P.2d 514, 517 (Cal. 1959))). 
 65. BURKE, supra note 60, at 75. 
 66. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (rev. ed. 1926), 
reprinted in MODEL LAND DEV. CODE art. 8, app. C (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968). 
 67. See id. 
 68. BURKE, supra note 60, at 75–76. 
 69. Danyahel Norris, Houston Gentrification: Options for Current Residents of the Third 
Ward, 35 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 239, 243 (2010). 
 70. Id. 
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is one of the main functions of local governments,71 which use zoning 
ordinances to preserve land for agriculture and open space, redevelop 
blighted neighborhoods, conserve natural resources, and achieve 
countless other goals that may be unique to each locale.72 
B. California Land-Use Law 
Modern land-use planning in California grew out of the 
perceived mistakes that occurred in conjunction with rapid economic 
growth and the resulting land development during the 1940s and 
1950s.73 Heightened social and environmental awareness nationwide 
led Congress to pass the National Environmental Policy Act74 in 1969 
and California to pass the California Environmental Quality Act75 in 
1970.76 Although California has required municipalities to adopt 
general plans for development since 1927,77 the state modified the 
California Government Code in 1971 to make the local general plan 
“a ‘constitution’ for future development.”78 
1. General Plans.  The State of California has delegated its land-
use authority to cities and counties, and it requires all municipalities 
to adopt and follow general plans to “guide future local land use 
 
 71. BURKE, supra note 60, at 75. 
 72. See generally Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws To Foster Green 
Building, Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2008). 
 73. See 1 JAMES LONGTIN, LONGTIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE 9–10 (3d prtg. 1994) (“The 
mistakes of the ’40s and ’50s became painfully apparent to the social activist generation of the 
’60s, thus spawning the advent of serious planning and environmental controls.”); see also Selby 
Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 514 P.2d 111, 117 (Cal. 1973) (“The deleterious 
consequences of haphazard community growth in this state and the need to prevent further 
random development are evident to even the most casual observer. The Legislature has 
attempted to alleviate the problem by authorizing the adoption of long-range plans for orderly 
progress.”). See generally KEVIN STARR, CALIFORNIA: A HISTORY 237–42 (2005) (providing an 
excellent discussion of the rapid and massive growth of California following World War II). In 
Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Ct. App. 1981), the California Court 
of Appeals upheld a local ordinance that made the collection of school fees a condition 
precedent to the development of property, capturing the state’s sentiment about unmanaged 
growth when it stated, “[d]evelopment is a privilege, not a right.” Id. at 691. 
 74. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4335, 4341–4347 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 75. California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, ch. 1433, 1970 Cal. Stat. 2780 (codified 
as amended at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012)). 
 76. LONGTIN, supra note 73, at 10. 
 77. Act of June 2, 1927, ch. 874, § 26, 1927 Cal. Stat. 1899, 1910–11. 
 78. Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 321 (Cal. 1990).  
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decisions.”79 The general plan is “located at the top of ‘the hierarchy 
of local government law regulating land use.’”80 Every municipality 
must “adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical 
development of the county or city, and of any land outside its 
boundaries which in the planning agency’s judgment bears relation to 
its planning.”81 All general plans are required to address seven 
“elements . . . to the extent that the subject of the element exists in 
the planning area.”82 The seven required elements are (1) land use, 
(2) circulation, (3) housing, (4) conservation, (5) open space, 
(6) noise, and (7) safety.83 A municipality may amend its general plan 
when “it deems it to be in the public interest,”84 but it may not amend 
any required element—including the land-use element—more than 
four times per year.85 
Although the California Legislature requires cities and counties 
to adopt and follow general plans, the Legislature did not intend for 
all general plans to look alike.86 One major way that general plans 
differ from one another is through the land-use element, which must 
designate the “general location and extent of the uses of the land for 
housing, business, industry, open space, including agriculture, natural 
resources, recreation, and enjoyment of scenic beauty, education, 
public buildings and grounds, solid and liquid waste disposal facilities, 
and other categories of public and private uses of land.”87 The land-
use element of a typical general plan contains many broad policy 
statements and goals as well as a map showing the location of each 
appropriate type of land use in the jurisdiction.88 
 
 79. DeVita v. Cnty. of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1025 (Cal. 1995). 
 80. Id. at 1024 (quoting Neighborhood Action Grp. v. Cnty. of Calaveras, 203 Cal. Rptr. 
401, 406 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
 81. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65300 (West 2010). 
 82. Id. § 65301(c). 
 83. Id. § 65302 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 84. Id. § 65358(a) (West 2010). 
 85. Id. § 65358(b). The code creates certain exemptions to this general rule, such as 
amendments to accommodate housing occupied by low-income individuals, id. § 65358(c), and 
amendments in response to a court order, id. § 65358(d)(1). 
 86. See id. § 65300.7 (“The Legislature finds that the diversity of the state’s communities 
and their residents requires planning agencies and legislative bodies to implement this article in 
ways that accommodate local conditions and circumstances, while meeting its minimum 
requirements.”). 
 87. Id. § 65302(a) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 88. See, e.g., Yuba City, Cal., Yuba City General Plan ch. 3 (2004), available at http://www.
yubacity.net/documents/Planning/YC-GPAC-Apr-04-Ch-3-FINAL.pdf (including “[t]he guiding 
principles of the land use framework [and] the General Plan Diagram”). 
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The California Government Code requires planning agencies to 
implement the general plan through other documents, one of which is 
the zoning ordinance.89 If the general plan is analogous to a 
“constitution” for future development,90 a zoning ordinance is 
analogous to a statute. The zoning ordinance itself, and decisions 
made pursuant to the zoning ordinance, must follow the general 
plan.91 “Additionally, general plans are policy documents, whereas 
zoning ordinances are laws.92 Therefore, a “general plan does not 
violate substantive due process as long as it advances any legitimate 
public purpose”93 whereas a zoning law “must clearly delineate the 
conduct it proscribes.”94 Because the zoning ordinance implements 
the general plan, a zoning regulation can be construed by referring to 
the general plan.95 
2. Zoning Ordinances: Permitted and Conditionally Permitted 
Uses.  California’s legislature permits municipalities to “divide a 
county, a city, or portions thereof, into zones.”96 In granting 
municipalities control over zoning decisions, the legislature provided 
only a few limitations “in order that counties and cities may exercise 
the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters,”97 while at 
the same time specifying certain minimum standards with which the 
municipalities must comply.98 For example, the legislature stated that 
all zoning regulations must “be uniform for each class or kind of 
 
 89. GOV’T § 65103(b) (West 2010). 
 90. Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 91. GOV’T § 65860 (West 2009); see also Fonseca v. City of Gilroy, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 379 
(Ct. App. 2007) (“Local land use decisions must be consistent with the general plan. Thus, for 
example, zoning ordinances, which are subordinate to the general plan, are required to be 
consistent with it.”). 
 92. JOHN EASTMAN, EASTMAN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE & MUNICIPAL LAW § 8.01 
(2008). 
 93. Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 94. Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 95. See EASTMAN, supra note 92, § 8.01 (“[Z]oning regulations may be construed by 
reference to the general plan; the general plan provides the backdrop against which zoning 
regulations are interpreted.”). 
 96. GOV’T § 65851. 
 97. Id. § 65800. 
 98. Id. § 65850. 
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building or use of land throughout each zone, but the regulation in 
one type of zone may differ from those in other types of zones.”99 
Zoning ordinances regulate land use via two mechanisms: 
(1) they divide the municipality into distinct geographic districts, and 
(2) they establish criteria and procedures for the evaluation of 
proposed uses within each district.100 Within the first mechanism, the 
zoning ordinance must conform to the policies contained in the 
general plan. As the Supreme Court of California explained: 
The Planning and Zoning Law itself precludes consideration of a 
zoning ordinance which conflicts with a general plan as a pro tanto 
repeal or implied amendment of the general plan. The general plan 
stands. A zoning ordinance that is inconsistent with the general plan 
is invalid when passed and one that was originally consistent but has 
become inconsistent must be brought into conformity with the 
general plan. The Planning and Zoning Law does not contemplate 
that general plans will be amended to conform to zoning ordinances. 
The tail does not wag the dog. The general plan is the charter to 
which the ordinance must conform.101 
Within the second mechanism, the evaluation of proposed uses, 
the zoning ordinance typically includes two types of regulations: 
(1) regulations that pertain to the “structural and architectural design 
of the buildings,” such as limitations on the height, size, and distance 
between buildings and property lines, and (2) regulations that 
“prescribe the use to which buildings within certain designated 
districts may be put.”102 A zoning map provides the zoning of each 
parcel, and a zoning ordinance contains the standards governing the 
allowable uses in a particular zone. To provide a clearer explanation 
of how zoning ordinances work, this Note uses Yuba City, California, 
to illustrate how one determines whether a use is permitted and what 
level of review is required to permit the use.103 
 
 99. Id. § 65852. This provision is professionally known by planners and developers as the 
“like uses alike” principle. 
 100. LONGTIN, supra note 73, at 234. 
 101. Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 1990) (citations 
omitted). 
 102. LONGTIN, supra note 73, at 234. 
 103. Because Guru Nanak and San Leandro only dealt with the permissibility of uses, this 
Note does not undertake a detailed discussion of structural and architectural standards, such as 
minimum lot size or height requirements. Exceptions to structural and architectural standards 
may be granted pursuant to a variance. Variance procedures are described in detail in section 
65906 of the California Government Code. Under this Note’s proposed reading of RLUIPA, a 
request for a variance would be an individualized assessment and thus within the scope of 
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Yuba City’s zoning ordinance104 is typical in that it employs a 
table to describe the allowable uses in a particular zone. The tables 
below are excerpted from the chapters pertaining to the M-1 (Light 
Industrial) and the R-1 (One-Family Residence) districts in Yuba 
City’s zoning ordinance.105 Although each zoning district permits 
different types of uses, the tables are similar in how they are 
organized: the first column provides a list of categorically permitted 
uses in the zoning district, and the second, third, and fourth columns 
correspond to the three types of review that Yuba City conducts for 
the allowable uses. The stringency of the review assigned to each use 
is based on the likelihood that the use will conflict with other existing 
or allowable uses in the same zoning district.106 





Auto body and painting 
shop 
X   
Cabinet shop X   
Bulk product storage 
(indoor) 
X   
Commercial coach 
(temporary) 
  X 
Commercial coach (less 
than 10,000 square feet) 






RLUIPA, assuming that the municipality’s zoning ordinance includes a mechanism for 
approving variance requests. 
 104. YUBA CITY, CAL., MUN. CODE, tit. 8, ch. 5 (2011). 
 105. For a complete list of uses in the M-1 district, see id. § 8-5.2002. For the list of uses in 
the R-1 district, see id. § 8-5.502. 
 106. See, e.g., id. § 8-5.7001 (stating that “[t]he process provides for increasing levels of 
review based on the size or intensity of a project”). 
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Model homes  X  
One-family residence X   
One-family residence 
(zero-lot line) 
X   
Parking lot for an off-
site use 
  X 
Public parks and 
playgrounds 
 X  
a. Permitted Uses and Uses Requiring a Zoning Clearance.  
Certain uses are permitted as a matter of right in each district. For 
example, in the M-1 district, one may operate an auto body and 
painting shop; in the R-1 district, one may construct a one-family 
residence. For permitted uses, planning staff review is limited to 
ensuring that all proposed uses conform to the minimum structural 
and architectural standards established for each district, such as lot 
size, minimum distance from property lines, and height 
requirements.107 
Certain uses, such as having a model home in the R-1 district, 
require a zoning clearance before they may be undertaken. To obtain 
a zoning clearance, the project proponent must demonstrate to the 
planning staff that the proposed project conforms to objective, use-
specific standards listed in the code in addition to the standards that 
are required for the permitted uses in the district.108 For example, an 
applicant who wants to establish a model home must first meet the 
minimum requirements of the R-1 district and must also obtain a 
zoning clearance to ensure compliance with the additional model-
home standards.109 If the proposal meets all of the requirements, 
 
 107. See, e.g., id. § 8.5-503 (requiring a “[m]inimum lot size” of “5,000 sq. ft., 6,000 sq. ft. for 
corner lots”).  
 108. For a description of Yuba City’s zoning-clearance procedures, see id. § 8-5.7002. 
 109. See id. § 8-5.5002(c) (establishing several standards specific to model homes, including a 
time limit for the operation of the home). 
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including the additional use-specific requirements, the code requires 
that the proposed use be approved.110 
b. Uses Requiring a Use Permit.  Although the California 
Government Code neither defines nor establishes standards for 
approving use permits,111 the California Supreme Court has stated 
that a use permit may be granted “after consideration by a 
governmental agency as to whether the proposed other use will be in 
the best interests of public convenience and necessity and not 
contrary to the public welfare.”112 Municipalities have substantial 
discretion in setting their own standards for issuing use permits, 
provided that the standards are set forth in a zoning ordinance.113 
Generally, the municipality reviews the proposed use in relation to 
the surrounding neighborhood and may approve the proposal if the 
use meets certain standards, including the “general welfare standard” 
and the “nuisance standard.”114 Use permits must conform not only to 
 
 110. Id. § 8-5.7002. 
 111. The government code does, however, refer to use permits. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T. 
CODE § 65850.5(b) (West 2009) (“[T]he city or county may require the applicant [of a solar 
energy system] to apply for a use permit.”); id. § 65852.7 (“A mobile home park . . . shall be 
deemed a permitted land use on all land planned and zoned for residential land use as 
designated by the applicable general plan; provided, however, that a city, county, or a city and 
county may require a use permit.”). 
 112. Sports Arenas Props., Inc. v. City of San Diego, 710 P.2d 338, 341 (Cal. 1985); see also 
People v. Perez, 29 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1963) (“The device of providing 
for the issuance of a special use permit is well recognized as legitimate zoning procedure. It 
permits the inclusion in the zoning pattern of uses considered by the legislative body to be 
essentially desirable to the community, but which because of the nature thereof or their 
concomitants (noise, traffic, congestion, effect on values, etc.,) militate against their existence in 
every location in a zone, or in any location without restrictions tailored to fit the special 
problems which the uses present.”). 
 113. Section 65905 of the California Government Code requires a planning agency to hold a 
public hearing for consideration of a use permit. To meet constitutional requirements for due 
process, the agency must also provide advance public notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a 
fair hearing. See Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura, 596 P.2d 1134, 1140 (Cal. 1979) (“We therefore 
conclude that, whenever approval of a tentative subdivision map will constitute a substantial or 
significant deprivation of the property rights of other landowners, the affected persons are 
entitled to a reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before the approval occurs.”). 
 114. The Conditional Use Permit, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH (Aug. 
1997), http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/cup/condition.htm. For a discussion of the general welfare 
standard, see generally Hawkins v. Cnty. of Marin, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 & n.8 (Ct. App. 
1976). For a discussion of the nuisance standard, see generally Snow v. City of Garden Grove, 
10 Cal. Rptr. 480, 481 (Ct. App. 1961).  
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the zoning ordinance115 but to the general plan as well.116 Additionally, 
the municipality must make written findings in support of any 
decision to approve or deny a use permit.117 
Yuba City requires a use permit for uses that may have an “effect 
on surrounding uses and the environment [that] typically cannot be 
determined in advance . . . for a particular location.”118 To determine 
when a use permit is required, one simply consults the appropriate 
use table. The planning commission must conduct a noticed public 
hearing and make findings about the appropriateness of the proposed 
use, given the surroundings and the “general welfare of the City.”119 
The use-permit process is designed to ensure that the proposed use is 
compatible with its surroundings. For example, one who applies to 
Yuba City for a use permit to construct a parking lot in Yuba City’s 
R-1 district might be required to shield parking lot lights to reduce 
glare on neighboring residences, to provide a larger setback than 
what would normally be required by the zoning ordinance, or to 
install additional landscaping or a wall to create a sound buffer. The 
conditions are context-specific and are imposed so as to permit a 
 
 115. See O’Hagen v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 96 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (Ct. App. 1971) (“To 
obtain a use permit, the applicant must generally show that the contemplated use is compatible 
with the policies and terms of the zoning ordinances . . . .”). 
 116. See Neighborhood Action Grp. v. Cnty. of Calaveras, 203 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (Ct. App. 
1984) (“Although use permits are not explicitly made subject to a general plan meeting the 
requirements of state law, that condition is necessarily to be implied from the hierarchal 
relationship of the land use laws. . . . [Thus,] a use permit is struck from the mold of the zoning 
law [GOV’T § 65901 (West 1966 & Supp. 1982)]; the zoning law must comply with the adopted 
general plan [GOV’T § 65860]; [and] the adopted general plan must conform with state law 
[GOV’T §§ 65300, 65302 (West 1966)]. The validity of the permit process derives from 
compliance with this hierarchy of planning laws.”). 
 117. See Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Cmty. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 522 P.2d 12, 13 (Cal. 
1974) (“We conclude that variance boards . . . must render findings to support their ultimate 
rulings.”).  
 118. YUBA CITY, CAL., MUN. CODE, tit. 8, ch. 5, § 8-5.7003 (2011). 
 119. See id. § 8-5.7003D (“Approval . . . shall only be granted when the following findings 
can be made, based on information in the record: 1. The proposal is consistent with the General 
Plan[, Yuba City, Cal., Yuba City General Plan ch. 3 (2004), available at http://www.yubacity
.net/documents/Planning/YC-GPAC-Apr-04-Ch-3-FINAL.pdf]. 2. The site for the proposed use 
is adequate in size and shape to accommodate said use, public access, parking and loading, 
yards, landscaping and other features required by this chapter. 3. The streets serving the site are 
adequate to carry the quantity of traffic generated by the proposed use. 4. The site design and 
the size and design of the buildings will complement neighboring facilities. 5. The establishment 
or operation of the use or building applied for will not be detrimental to the health, safety, 
peace, comfort, and general welfare of persons residing or working in the vicinity of the 
proposed use or be detrimental or injurious to property and improvements in the neighborhood 
or to the general welfare of the City.”).  
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specific use on one specific property that might otherwise be 
prohibited due to the incompatibility of the proposed use with the 
existing or anticipated uses of neighboring properties.120 
3. Unlisted or Prohibited Uses and Zoning Ordinance 
Amendments.  Zoning ordinances cannot anticipate every potential 
land use, and municipalities manage this uncertainty in a variety of 
ways. Some ordinances contain a provision that “uses not specifically 
permitted are prohibited.”121 Other zoning ordinances contain rules of 
construction that give an official, such as the planning director, the 
discretion to determine whether a proposed use is similar “in 
character and impact to a listed use.”122 If it is, the planning director 
has the discretion to treat the proposed use in the same way as the 
listed use.123 
If a person proposes a use in a zoning district that does not 
explicitly list the use, and if a reasonable construction of the zoning 
ordinance leads to the conclusion that the zoning district does not 
permit the use, the person has the option of seeking a zoning 
amendment. Zoning amendments generally come in two forms: a 
zoning-text amendment and a zoning-map amendment. A zoning-text 
amendment amends the zoning code itself to change the list of 
permitted uses in the applicable zoning district to include the 
proposed use.124 A zoning-map amendment occurs when the parcel’s 
zoning designation is changed to a different zoning designation that 
permits the proposed use.125 
The California Government Code sets forth the minimum 
procedures that govern both types of amendments.126 First, the 
 
 120. As noted in Part II.A, section 65852 of the California Government Code requires that 
zoning regulations “be uniform for each class or kind of building or use of land throughout each 
zone.” Nonetheless, courts have held that it does not violate the uniformity requirement to, with 
the consent of the project proponent, impose reasonable conditions of approval on projects, 
even if the conditions vary from parcel to parcel. See, e.g., J-Marion Co. v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 
142 Cal. Rptr. 723, 726 (Ct. App. 1977) (“[U]se limitations imposed upon land by consensual 
agreement are not violative of the uniformity provisions of section 65852 . . . .”). 
 121. BURKE, supra note 60, at 89. 
 122. E.g., MUN. CODE § 8-5.111. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Text and Map Amendments, UNIV. CITY, MO., http://www.ucitymo.org/
index.aspx?NID=318 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (“A text amendment is a procedure that 
changes the written provisions of the ordinances contained in the [z]oning [c]ode.”). 
 125. See, e.g., id. (“A map amendment is a procedure that changes the zoning district for a 
piece of property and therefore changes the zoning map.”). 
 126. GOV’T §§ 65853–65857 (West 2009).  
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planning commission is required to conduct a public hearing.127 
Following the public hearing, the commission must provide a written 
recommendation supported by its reasons to the municipality’s 
legislative body, such as the city council.128 If the planning commission 
recommends approval of the zoning amendment, the legislative body 
must hold a noticed public hearing after which it may approve, 
modify, or disapprove the planning commission’s recommendation.129 
4. Procedural Distinctions Between Zoning Amendments and Use 
Permits.  Decisions about whether to adopt or amend zoning 
ordinances are “legislative acts,”130 whereas decisions about whether 
to approve use permits are adjudicative, or “quasi-judicial” acts.131 
“[A] legislative act generally predetermines what the rules shall be for 
the regulation of future cases falling under its provisions, while an 
adjudicatory act applies law to determine specific rights based upon 
specific facts ascertained from evidence adduced at a hearing.”132 This 
distinction is significant because California land-use law and the 
California Code of Civil Procedure133 treat legislative and adjudicative 
acts differently in terms of how such acts are approved as well as in 
terms of how a party may challenge the validity of each type of act. 
First, “only those governmental decisions which are adjudicative 
in nature are subject to procedural due process principles. Legislative 
action is not burdened by such requirements.”134 As such, the 
California Government Code requires planning agencies to conduct a 
 
 127. Id. § 65854. 
 128. Id. § 65855. 
 129. Id. §§ 65856–65857. 
 130. See Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.11 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(“[Z]oning enactments that affect large populations are legislative in nature.”); DeVita v. Cnty. 
of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1024 n.3 (Cal. 1995) (“[T]he current planning law recognizes 
unequivocally that planning is a legislative undertaking . . . .”); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa 
Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 566–67 (Cal. 1980) (“California precedent has settled the principle that 
zoning ordinances, whatever the size of parcel affected, are legislative acts.”). 
 131. See The Conditional Use Permit, supra note 114 (“The approval of a conditional use 
permit is an administrative, quasi-judicial act. It is not a change of zone, but rather a project-
specific change in the uses allowed on a specific property. Conditional use permits do not 
involve the establishment of new codes, regulations, or policies. Instead, a conditional use 
permit applies the provisions of the zoning ordinance and its standards to the specific set of 
circumstances which characterize the proposed land use.”).  
 132. Joint Council of Interns & Residents v. Bd. of Supervisors, 258 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
 133. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1084–1097 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
 134. Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura, 596 P.2d 1134, 1137 (Cal. 1979). 
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noticed public hearing prior to making a decision about whether to 
approve or deny a use permit.135 Municipalities are also required to 
make findings prior to approving or denying a use permit. By 
contrast, because the amendment of a zoning ordinance is a 
legislative action, municipalities are not required to make findings 
regarding a decision to approve or deny a zoning amendment.136 
Second, in California, local land-use decisions must be 
challenged by seeking a writ of mandate (also called mandamus), and 
the nature of the writ differs based on the decision being 
challenged.137 “The importance of proceeding by a writ of mandate in 
land use litigation in state court cannot be overemphasized. The 
failure to seek the writ may be a sufficient ground by itself for adverse 
judgment.”138 Writs of mandate take two forms: the writ of ordinary 
mandate139 and the writ of administrative mandate.140 The writ of 
ordinary mandate is the appropriate procedure to challenge 
legislative acts, such as the adoption or amendment of a zoning 
ordinance.141 The writ of administrative mandate must be used to 
challenge adjudicative acts, such as the decision about whether to 
approve a use permit.142 Courts are much more deferential to the 
planning agency in ordinary mandate than they are in administrative 
 
 135. The public hearing requirement is contained in section 65905 of the California 
Government Code, and the notice requirements are contained in section 65091 of the California 
Government Code. 
 136. See Native Sun/Lyon Cmtys. v. City of Escondido, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 355 (Ct. App. 
1993) (“Legislative acts, of course, do not require findings.”). 
 137. For procedural requirements for the use of these writs, see CIV. PROC. §§ 1084–1097. 
 138. EASTMAN, supra note 92, § 21.01. 
 139. CIV. PROC. § 1085.  
 140. Id. § 1094.5. The terms “ordinary” and “traditional” mandate are not used in the 
California Code of Civil Procedure. The terms are used by practitioners to distinguish the 
procedure in section 1085 from the procedure in section 1094.5. Likewise, the term “writ of 
administrative mandate” is not used in the California Code of Civil Procedure. 
 141. See Cnty. of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 184 (Ct. App. 
1999) (“Mandate will also lie to correct the exercise of discretionary legislative power, but only 
if the action taken is fraudulent or so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to reveal an abuse 
of discretion as a matter of law. This test is highly deferential, as it should be when the court is 
called upon to interfere with the exercise of legislative discretion by an elected governmental 
body. Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome this presumption the 
petitioner must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is 
unreasonable and invalid.” (citations omitted)). 
 142. CIV. PROC. § 1094.5. 
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mandate.143 Thus, in California the distinctions between zoning 
amendments and use permits have great significance. 
III. DISTINGUISHING TWO APPLICATIONS OF RLUIPA: GURU 
NANAK AND SAN LEANDRO 
This Note now builds upon the RLUIPA and land-use 
background information introduced in the preceding Parts to examine 
two Ninth Circuit RLUIPA cases. One case involved a rezoning, and 
the other case involved a use permit. In Guru Nanak, the Ninth 
Circuit found that Sutter County, California, imposed a substantial 
burden on a religious organization when the country denied two 
successive use-permit applications, on two separate parcels, made by 
the Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City (Guru Nanak) to build a 
temple.144 In San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit found that the City of 
San Leandro, California may have imposed a substantial burden on a 
religious organization without articulating a compelling reason when 
the city denied the organization’s requests for a zoning-map 
amendment, a zoning-text amendment, and a use permit that was 
contingent upon approval of either of the rezoning requests.145 In 
reaching its decision in San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily 
on the reasoning contained in Guru Nanak146 but failed to distinguish 
between the types of land-use applications and the types of 
assessments that the municipalities conducted in the two cases. Guru 
Nanak involved an individualized assessment of a use permit, whereas 
San Leandro involved a generalized assessment of two zoning 
ordinance amendments. The Ninth Circuit should have drawn this 
distinction between the use permits at issue in Guru Nanak and the 
 
 143. Compare Garrick Dev. Co. v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 902 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (“Such limited review [under the narrower standards of ordinary mandate] is 
grounded on the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanctions the legislative delegation 
of authority to the agency and (2) acknowledges the presumed expertise of the agency.”), with 
Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Cmty. v. Los Angeles Cnty., 522 P.2d 12, 13 (Cal. 1974) (requiring 
Los Angeles County to vacate its grant of a variance in administrative mandate, stating that “a 
reviewing court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings of the 
administrative board and whether the findings support the board’s action”). 
 144. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 145. See Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 
(9th Cir.) (“We find that there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the City 
imposed a substantial burden on the Church’s religious exercise under RLUIPA.”), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). 
 146. See id. at 1066–70 (citing Guru Nanak repeatedly). 
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amendments to zoning ordinances at issue in San Leandro. Therefore, 
the Ninth Circuit should have concluded that decisions by a 
municipality about whether to amend its zoning ordinance are 
“generalized assessments” that fall outside the scope of RLUIPA’s 
Section 5 hook. 
A. Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter 
In 2001, Guru Nanak proposed to construct a temple to serve 
seventy-five people on a 1.89-acre parcel that it owned on Grove 
Road in Sutter County, California.147 The parcel was located in the R-
1 district, which was used primarily for large-lot, single-family homes, 
and which allowed churches and temples, subject to the issuance of a 
conditional-use permit.148 Sutter County’s zoning code’s goal is to 
ensure that uses that “have the potential to negatively impact 
adjoining properties and uses” receive “a more comprehensive 
review . . . in order to evaluate and mitigate any potentially 
detrimental impacts.”149 The planning commission may—but need 
not—approve or conditionally approve the use permit after it makes 
several findings regarding the impact of the proposed use and its 
consistency with the general plan.150 Sutter County’s planning staff 
reviewed Guru Nanak’s proposal and recommended that the planning 
commission grant Guru Nanak’s use permit, subject to certain 
conditions designed to mitigate any potential conflicts between the 
temple and the nearby established residences.151 In spite of the 
planning staff’s recommendation, and based on concerns about 
increased traffic and noise resulting from the proposed temple, the 
planning commission unanimously denied the use permit.152 
In 2002, Guru Nanak acquired a 28.79-acre parcel located on 
George Washington Boulevard in Sutter County.153 Guru Nanak 
proposed to convert a 2300-square-foot single-family home located on 
the parcel into a temple by adding approximately five hundred square 
feet to the structure.154 The property contained an orchard, as did all 
 
 147. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 981–82. 
 148. Id. at 982. 
 149. SUTTER COUNTY, CAL., ZONING CODE § 1500-8210 (2010). 
 150. Id. § 1500-8216. 
 151. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 982. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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surrounding parcels.155 The nearest residence was over two hundred 
feet from Guru Nanak’s northern property line and over three 
hundred feet from the proposed temple.156 The parcel was located in 
land zoned as AG, a classification for general agricultural use, which, 
like the R-1 district, permitted churches and temples subject to the 
issuance of a use permit.157 
Guru Nanak applied for a use permit and proposed to limit each 
service to seventy-five people.158 Once again, staff recommended that 
the planning commission approve the project, subject to several 
conditions, including the addition of landscaping beyond what the 
zoning ordinance required, limitations on the type of lighting, 
construction dust mitigation, a prohibition on any type of 
development within twenty-five feet of the north property line, 
prohibitions on any outdoor services or musical events, and a limit on 
the number of people on the site to seventy-five at a time.159 
During the public hearing, a representative of the temple pointed 
out the differences between Guru Nanak’s earlier Grove Road 
application and its new George Washington Boulevard application.160 
Several neighbors spoke in opposition to the project, again citing 
noise and traffic concerns.161 Some also believed that the temple 
would conflict with the surrounding agricultural uses and depreciate 
property values in the area.162 By a vote of four to three, the planning 
commission approved the project.163 Several neighbors appealed the 
planning commission’s decision to the Sutter County Board of 
Supervisors.164 
County planning staff prepared a report for the board meeting 
that specifically addressed the neighbors’ concerns and recommended 
that the board affirm the planning commission’s approval.165 In spite 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 983. 
 159. SUTTER CNTY. PLANNING STAFF MEMORANDUM, Sutter Cnty. Planning Comm’n 5–9, 
11–12 (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.co.sutter.ca.us/pdf/cs/pc/staff_reports/2002/
UP_02-01_Nanak_Sikh.pdf. 
 160. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 983. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. The church agreed to concessions which included, among other things, increasing 
the approved twenty-five-foot buffer along the north property line to one hundred feet. Id.  
ERTMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2012  1:01 PM 
104 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:79 
of the planning staff’s recommendation, the board unanimously 
reversed the planning commission and denied Guru Nanak’s use 
permit.166 Guru Nanak sued Sutter County under RLUIPA, claiming 
that the board’s denial of its second use permit constituted a 
“substantial burden” on its religious exercise.167 
The district court granted Guru Nanak’s motion for summary 
judgment, invalidated the county’s denial, and enjoined the county to 
immediately grant Guru Nanak’s application because it found that 
Sutter County had substantially burdened religious exercise without 
evidence of a compelling interest to justify the burden.168 The district 
court was troubled by the county’s multiple denials, especially in light 
of the fact that Guru Nanak purchased its second property to address 
the county’s stated concerns behind its denial of Guru Nanak’s first 
application.169 The county appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision.170  
B. International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San 
Leandro 
Founded in San Leandro in 1947, the Faith Fellowship 
Foursquare Church, a congregation affiliated with the ICFG,171 had 
sixty-five members in 1993.172 Although it constructed a new sanctuary 
with nearly seven hundred seats in 2003, the congregation had 
outgrown its space by 2005 and began to look for a larger property.173 
 
 166. Id. at 984. 
 167. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1148 
(E.D. Cal. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1152 (“[T]he denial of the use permit, particularly when coupled with the denial 
of [Guru Nanak’s] previous application, actually inhibits [Guru Nanak’s] religious exercise.”). 
 170. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 981. 
 171. The plaintiff in the case was the ICFG, which “alleges that the real party in interest is 
Faith Fellowship Foursquare Church . . . , a congregation affiliated with ICFG, and located in 
San Leandro.” Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 632 F. Supp. 2d 
925, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. The church conducted three Sunday services for more than 1,700 congregants. Id. 
During the week, it provided a variety of programs serving different groups, including “children, 
the disadvantaged, women, youth, and persons struggling with addictions.” Id. On Wednesday 
nights, the church used a kitchen “smaller than the kitchen in most homes” to feed between 
three hundred and four hundred people. Id. The church asserted that its parking lot could 
accommodate only 154 vehicles, forcing members to park on surrounding residential streets, “as 
much as a 20-minute walk away from the Church.” Id. at 930. 
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At the time, the city permitted “assembly uses” in the R (residential) 
districts subject to the issuance of a conditional-use permit, but it 
prohibited assembly uses in all commercial and industrial districts.174 
In March 2006, the ICFG signed a purchase agreement for a property 
in a district zoned IP (Industrial Park).175 In May 2006, church officials 
met with the planning staff to discuss their proposed use.176 The staff 
advised the ICFG officials that the IP zone did not allow assembly 
uses and that the text of the zoning code would need to be amended 
before a church, or any assembly use, could locate on an industrially 
zoned parcel, including the parcels that the ICFG had agreed to 
purchase.177 The ICFG subsequently applied to rezone the property as 
IL (Industrial Limited), and applied to amend the text of the zoning 
code to establish use permit procedures for conditionally permitting 
assembly uses in the IL district.178 On April 12, 2007, the city’s 
planning commission voted to deny the ICFG’s rezoning and 
amendment applications because they conflicted with two provisions 
of the city’s general plan.179 The ICFG appealed the decision to the 
city council,180 which on May 7, 2007, unanimously upheld the 
planning commission’s denial of the proposed rezoning.181 The 
planning staff offered to assist the ICFG in its effort to locate a 
different, appropriately zoned parcel.182 The ICFG accepted the 
planning staff’s offer but also filed a lawsuit on July 12, 2007.183 
In its lawsuit, the ICFG alleged several constitutional claims and 
the following three RLUIPA claims: (1) “that the City’s land use 
restrictions place a ‘substantial burden on religious exercise,’” (2) 
“that the denial of the rezoning application constitutes ‘treatment of 
religious assembly on less than equal terms with nonreligious 
 
 174. Id at 930. Assembly uses included activities performed by secular and nonsecular users, 
such as churches, clubs, lodges, and other organizations. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 930–34. The ICFG also applied for a use permit pursuant to the new standards it 
requested the city to adopt in the IL district. Id. at 931. 
 179. Id. at 934.  
 180. At about the same time, the ICFG applied for a use permit under the existing zoning. 
Id. This application is somewhat inexplicable because the existing zoning did not allow use 
permits for assembly uses. Id. The city, nonetheless, processed and denied the use permit on the 
grounds that the proposed use was inconsistent with the property’s zoning. Id. at 934–35. 
 181. Id. at 934. 
 182. Id. at 935. 
 183. Id. 
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assembly,’” and (3) “that the denial of the Church’s use of [its] 
property constitutes ‘total exclusion from jurisdiction or unreasonable 
limits on religious assemblies within jurisdiction.’”184 
The district court granted San Leandro’s motion for summary 
judgment on all claims. Regarding the substantial-burden claim, the 
district court found the city’s zoning code to be “clearly neutral” 
because it “treats religious assemblies on the same footing as other 
assembly uses, and permits those uses with a conditional use permit in 
areas zoned R—which constitute more than 50% of the City’s land 
area.”185 The district court further found that the ICFG failed to 
provide sufficient evidence to support its claim that no other suitable 
properties existed in the city, and that, even if the ICFG had provided 
sufficient evidence, a dearth of properties does not equal a substantial 
burden “[i]n the absence of a showing that the City acted arbitrarily 
in ways suggesting actual discrimination.”186 The district court also 
noted that RLUIPA does not require cities to grant religious users 
“preferential rights over other property owners, or to protect 
churches from the reality that the marketplace might dictate that 
certain facilities are not available to those who desire them.”187 
Regarding the equal-terms claim, the district court held, among other 
things, that the city treated the ICFG’s proposed use no differently 
than any other assembly use when it denied the applications.188 The 
court noted that the ICFG’s argument, “carried to its logical 
conclusion, would mean that the City could not zone its land for 
categories of uses.”189 Regarding the ICFG’s total-exclusion claim, the 
district court held that churches are not totally excluded from San 
Leandro because approximately 54.6 percent of the city can 
accommodate assembly uses.190 The court further noted that the 
ICFG’s claim could not rest “simply on the fact that the Church has 
 
 184. Id. at 935–36 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), (b)(1), (b)(3) (2006)). 
 185. Id. at 942. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 946–47. 
 189. Id. at 947. 
 190. After meeting with the church officials, the planning staff examined all nonresidential 
parcels in San Leandro to determine whether any of them could accommodate assembly uses in 
a way that would comply with the general plan. Id. at 933–34. At the end of its review, the staff 
determined that an additional 196 properties could accommodate assembly uses. Id. The city 
created the “AU Overlay District” to allow assembly uses on these 196 parcels without changing 
the remainder of each parcel’s underlying zoning. Id. 
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decided that the only property that will suit it is one that the City will 
not zone for assembly use.”191 
The ICFG appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that “there is a triable 
issue of material fact regarding whether the City imposed a 
substantial burden . . . under RLUIPA” and “that the City failed as a 
matter of law to prove a compelling interest for its actions.”192 The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that “while the zoning scheme itself may be 
facially neutral and generally applicable, the individualized 
assessment that the City made to determine that the Church’s 
rezoning and CUP [conditional-use permit] request should be denied 
is not.”193 The Ninth Circuit determined that the city’s denial was 
subject to RLUIPA’s compelling interest test when it said: 
The City’s treatment of the Church’s applications constitutes an 
“individualized assessment.” Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City 
v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, the 
City’s Zoning Code undeniably is a “system of land use regulations” 
within the meaning of RLUIPA because it is a system of “zoning 
[laws] . . . that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of 
land . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5).194 
The Ninth Circuit thus relied on Guru Nanak as a guide for its 
RLUIPA analysis, but in doing so, the court ignored the most 
important distinguishing feature between the two cases. Specifically, 
the Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge that Sutter County conducted 
an individualized assessment in response to Guru Nanak’s requested 
use permit, whereas San Leandro conducted a generalized assessment 
in response to the ICFG’s requested zoning amendments. Part IV 
offers a reading of RLUIPA that distinguishes between individualized 
and generalized assessments, a distinction that the Ninth Circuit 
failed to recognize in San Leandro. 
 
 191. Id. at 948. 
 192. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). 
 193. Id. at 1066. 
 194. Id. (alterations in original). 
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IV.  GENERALIZED VS. INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENTS: THE 
CORRECT CONSTRUCTION OF RLUIPA 
This Part argues that the Ninth Circuit was correct in Guru 
Nanak but incorrect in San Leandro when it held that the land-use 
requests in each case were individualized assessments within the 
scope of RLUIPA. It offers an analysis of RLUIPA that draws a 
principled distinction between the two cases and shows that San 
Leandro’s denials of the ICFG’s rezoning requests were outside the 
scope of RLUIPA because the city conducted a generalized 
assessment rather than an individualized assessment. 
In San Leandro, the ICFG requested both a zoning-map and a 
zoning-text amendment. The zoning-map amendment would have 
changed the zoning of the ICFG’s parcel of land, and the zoning-text 
amendment would have permitted assembly uses on all parcels 
already located in the proposed zoning classification throughout the 
city.195 When it held that San Leandro’s “treatment of the Church’s 
applications constituted an ‘individualized assessment,’”196 the Ninth 
Circuit fundamentally misunderstood the nature of a zoning 
ordinance and the nature of a request to amend a zoning ordinance.197 
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize what a municipality 
actually does when it reviews amendments to the zoning ordinance; 
the municipality conducts a generalized assessment of the 
implications of approving a zoning-map amendment, and it conducts 
a generalized assessment of the jurisdiction-wide effects of the 
zoning-text amendments. The assessments are generalized because 
the municipality considers jurisdiction-wide impacts beyond the 
specific impacts of the project that prompted the proposed 
amendments. 
 
 195. See supra Part III.B. 
 196. San Leandro, 673 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. 
of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
 197. Interestingly, when the Ninth Circuit denied San Leandro’s petition for a rehearing en 
banc, it issued an amended opinion that made four changes. Id. at 1060–61. One of the changes 
modified a sentence in the original opinion that read as follows: “There is no dispute that the 
City’s treatment of the Church’s applications constitutes an ‘individualized assessment.’” Int’l 
Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 634 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011), 
reh’g en banc denied, amended, and superseded by San Leandro, 673 F.3d. The amended opinion 
deleted the words “[t]here is no dispute that.” San Leandro, 673 F.3d at 1060. The sentence now 
reads as follows: “The City’s treatment of the Church’s applications constitutes an 
‘individualized assessment.’” Id. at 1066. 
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A. Consideration of a Zoning-Map Amendment 
When a municipality considers a request for a zoning-map 
amendment, it must evaluate the implications of the project under 
consideration. But for two reasons, the municipality’s assessment goes 
beyond an evaluation of the effects of that single project. First, as 
soon as the zoning map is amended, the owner of that parcel may 
establish any of the uses permitted in the new zoning classification.198 
If one or more of the permitted uses in the proposed zoning 
classification have the potential to conflict with the uses of the 
surrounding properties, then a municipality would have a valid reason 
for denying the map amendment.199 Second, the new zoning 
classification will apply to that parcel indefinitely, not only during the 
life of the sought-after use.200 In San Leandro, the city would have 
considered the potential impacts of the ICFG’s proposed church, but 
it also would have considered the potential impacts of every other 
possible use on the subject parcel that the new zoning classification 
would permit. Stated differently, after the zoning of the parcel was 
amended, the ICFG—and any future user—could have operated any 
of the other uses permitted in the new district. San Leandro’s 
assessment of the rezoning proposal was therefore generalized. 
By contrast, when a municipality considers a request for a use 
permit, it makes an individualized assessment of that proposed use. 
For example, when Guru Nanak applied to Sutter County for its use 
permits, the county evaluated only the proposed temple in the 
context of the surrounding properties.201 In both use permit 
applications, planning staff recommended conditions of approval that 
were tailored to the specific use and location, such as a limit to the 
number of people on the property, additional landscaping, and a 
larger building setback.202 Even if Guru Nanak had chosen not to use 
its property for the proposed temple, the underlying zoning of its 
parcel would have remained the same. Sutter County’s assessment of 
the religious land use was individualized because approval of the use 
 
 198. See supra Part II.B. 
 199. Generally, a municipality may not place conditions on one particular parcel within a 
zoning classification to preclude certain permitted uses it might find objectionable. For a 
discussion of the “like uses alike” principle, see supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra Part II.B. 
 201. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 202. See supra Part III.A. 
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permit would allow no other uses beyond those that were specifically 
requested. 
B. Consideration of a Zoning-Text Amendment 
Similarly, when a municipality considers a proposal to amend the 
text of its zoning code, it must necessarily consider implications 
beyond those associated with the project that prompted the proposed 
amendment.203 Because of the “like uses alike” principle, all parcels in 
a zoning district must be governed by the same rules.204 Therefore, 
when the ICFG requested to amend the zoning ordinance to allow 
assembly uses in the IL district with a use permit, San Leandro would 
have assessed the request for its suitability on the ICFG’s property, 
but it also needed to consider the implications of the proposed change 
on every parcel with IL zoning throughout the entire city. Even if the 
proposal had been suitable on the ICFG’s property, San Leandro 
could have determined that the proposal to allow assembly uses with 
a use permit would have been unworkable on at least one other 
parcel with the same zoning classification. Denying the zoning-text 
amendment for this reason would have been legitimate and 
completely unrelated to the ICFG’s use of its property. 
By contrast, when a municipality considers a request for a use 
permit, the permit is confined to the property that was the subject of 
the application for the time allowed by the permit. The assessments 
that Sutter County conducted in Guru Nanak were individualized 
assessments because approval of the requested use permit would have 
been limited to Guru Nanak’s parcel and would have had no effect on 
any other properties in the county. 
In San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit relied on Guru Nanak for the 
premise that RLUIPA applies to land-use decisions that result from 
an individualized assessment of a proposed project.205 Assuming 
RLUIPA’s constitutionality,206 this reliance represents a correct 
statement of the law, but the Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish 
between the different types of land-use entitlements that were at issue 
in the two cases. The court specifically stated that “while the zoning 
 
 203. See supra Part II.B.3–4. 
 204. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65830 (West 2009).  
 205. See supra notes 192–194 and accompanying text. 
 206. Not all would agree that RLUIPA is constitutional even as applied to individualized 
assessments of the type conducted by Sutter County in Guru Nanak. See, e.g., MARCI A. 
HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2007). 
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scheme itself may be facially neutral and generally applicable, the 
individualized assessment that the City made to determine that the 
Church’s rezoning and CUP request should be denied is not.”207 The 
Ninth Circuit never acknowledged that the ICFG’s use-permit 
application could be processed only after the zoning map was 
amended to change the ICFG’s property from IP to IL, and only after 
the zoning-ordinance text was amended to allow assembly uses with a 
use permit in the IL district. Although San Leandro considered the 
impacts of the proposal on the ICFG’s parcel, it also had to consider 
the impacts that the proposal would have had on the rest of the city.208 
To say that the city conducted an individualized assessment of the 
ICFG’s rezoning applications only comprehends part of what the city 
assessed. By applying RLUIPA to generalized assessments such as 
the ones the city conducted in San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit 
expanded the coverage of RLUIPA’s Section 5 jurisdictional hook, 
which, by its own terms, applies only to “individualized 
assessments.”209 The Ninth Circuit’s construction of RLUIPA renders 
the statute overbroad by precluding legitimate conduct in the process 
of attempting to prevent unconstitutional discrimination. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBTS AVOIDED BY A NEW ANALYSIS OF 
RLUIPA 
According to the Supreme Court, “The so-called canon of 
constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that 
ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious 
constitutional doubts.”210 Courts presume that the legislature would 
not intend to pass a law that raises constitutional questions.211 Thus, 
when a statute could be interpreted in multiple ways, a court will 
 
 207. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).  
 208. In fact, after the city’s planning staff received and began to evaluate the ICFG’s 
application, they expressed concern about the citywide impacts of amending the zoning text to 
allow assembly uses on other parcels in the IL district. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. 
City of San Leandro, 632 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). The staff therefore began to develop an alternative 
mechanism for liberalizing the treatment of assembly uses citywide. Id. at 932. As a result of this 
effort, the city adopted the “Assembly Use Overlay District,” and recommended applying it to 
196 nonresidential parcels. Id. at 933. The ICFG’s parcel was not one of the 196. Id. at 934.  
 209. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 210. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009). 
 211. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (“This canon is followed out of respect for 
Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”). 
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“avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders 
constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses 
no constitutional question.”212 
As discussed in Part IV, RLUIPA’s scope-of-application section 
has two plausible readings, only one of which raises serious 
constitutional questions. Under one reading, the reading for which 
this Note advocates, RLUIPA applies only when the government 
conducts an individualized assessment of the religious institution’s 
proposed use of its land. Under the other reading, the reading 
declared by the Ninth Circuit in San Leandro, RLUIPA applies to 
any assessment of a land-use entitlement that is requested by a 
religious user, regardless of whether granting the entitlement will 
change the allowable uses of property other than the property owned 
by the religious institution. This latter reading creates constitutional 
doubt. 
The reading of RLUIPA proposed by this Note has three major 
virtues in addition to those discussed in Part IV. First, unlike the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Leandro, it comports with Supreme 
Court precedent regarding the Free Exercise Clause and Congress’s 
Section 5 power to enforce it. Second, it preserves the ability of state 
and local governments to exercise their reserved police powers for 
land-use planning. Third, it continues to allow RLUIPA to protect 
religious institutions such as Guru Nanak when the government 
substantially burdens their religious exercise in the course of making 
an individualized assessment about whether to grant an exemption 
from the generally applicable land-use rules. 
A. Congressional Authority To Enforce, Not Expand, the Free 
Exercise Clause 
RLUIPA prohibits governments from imposing a substantial 
burden on religious exercise through land-use regulations “under 
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal 
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, 
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property 
involved.”213 This language appears to be tailored to track the Court’s 
language in Boerne when it quoted Smith to distinguish those two 
cases from an earlier line of Free Exercise Clause cases that imposed 
 
 212. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989). 
 213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
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strict scrutiny on government acts which caused religious hardship 
“where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions.”214 
But an individual exemption is not the same thing as an individualized 
assessment. Because assessments cover more actions than exemptions, 
the Ninth Circuit’s reading of RLUIPA expands Congress’s Section 5 
power beyond what the Court recognized in Boerne. 
Contrasting San Leandro and Guru Nanak is helpful here. In 
Guru Nanak, the applicant sought a use permit pursuant to the 
system and procedures that were established in Sutter County’s 
zoning code.215 When a use permit is granted, the underlying zoning 
remains the same; the applicant therefore requests something akin to 
an exemption from the zoning that otherwise would prohibit the use 
for which he or she applied. In other words, a use permit is an 
exemption from a generally applicable law. In San Leandro, the 
religious institution applied for a zoning-map and a zoning-text 
amendment.216 Although zoning ordinances may be amended, the 
amendment process is not an exemption because a zoning 
amendment changes the underlying law that applies to the applicant 
as well as to every other land user in the jurisdiction. Stated 
differently, a zoning amendment is not a request for an exemption to 
a generally applicable law. It is a request to change the law itself. 
When San Leandro assessed the ICFG’s application for a zoning-
map and a zoning-text amendment, it was not evaluating whether to 
grant the ICFG an exemption. When considering the zoning-map 
amendment, the planning commission conducted a generalized 
assessment to determine whether to change the underlying law that 
would apply to the ICFG’s property. The zoning-text amendment 
required a similar generalized assessment to determine whether to 
change the underlying law that would apply throughout the entire IL 
zoning district. The Ninth Circuit’s construction of RLUIPA in San 
Leandro requires governments to articulate a compelling interest 
whenever they deny a request for a change in the underlying law. A 
proper reading of RLUIPA in light of Smith and Boerne would 
require a compelling interest only when a government fails to extend 
a preexisting system of exemptions to a religious institution. Smith 
and Boerne simply do not acknowledge a congressional authority to 
 
 214. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 884 (1990)); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra Part III.A. 
 216. See supra Part III.B. 
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impose strict scrutiny when a government denies a request by a 
religious institution to change the underlying, generally applicable 
law.217 
B. Reading Congruence and Proportionality into RLUIPA To 
Preserve Values of Federalism 
As discussed in Part II, land-use planning in California is a highly 
specialized subset of California law, best thought of as a hierarchy of 
regulation types. As the California Supreme Court has stated, “[T]he 
general plan truly became, and today remains, a ‘constitution . . . for 
future development’ located at the top of the ‘hierarchy of local 
government law regulating land use.’”218 If general plans are 
constitutions and zoning ordinances are statutes implementing the 
constitutions, use permits are “a system of individual exemptions”219 
from the generally applicable rules governing the permissible uses of 
property within a jurisdiction.220 
Beyond requiring jurisdictions to articulate a compelling interest 
when they refuse to approve a rezoning request, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in San Leandro makes plain that the city’s reasons for 
denying the rezoning request—that approving the request would have 
conflicted with two important general plan provisions—did not 
constitute a compelling interest.221 But approving the application to 
avoid liability under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of RLUIPA 
would result in a conflict with the California Government Code, 
which states that “[c]ounty or city zoning ordinances shall be 
consistent with the general plan of the county or city.”222 
To solve this dilemma, a municipality could amend the general 
plan to conform to the religious institution’s proposed zoning. This 
solution might not be possible in all instances, however, because the 
 
 217. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 218. DeVita v. Cnty. of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Cal. 1995) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City 
of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 321 (Cal. 1990); and Neighborhood Action Grp. v. Cnty. of 
Calaveras, 203 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
 219. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514. 
 220. See supra Part II. In other words, by having a process by which a municipality may 
approve something that is otherwise prohibited, the municipality establishes a system of 
individual exemptions similar to those that were at issue in Smith. 
 221. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). 
 222. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65860(a) (West 2009). 
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general plan must be internally consistent.223 Moreover, this solution 
misses the point of a general plan. As the California Supreme Court 
has stated, “The Planning and Zoning Law does not contemplate that 
general plans will be amended to conform to zoning ordinances. The 
tail does not wag the dog.”224 The Ninth Circuit’s holding thus 
intrudes into California’s land-use decision-making process in two 
ways: it upends the relationship between the zoning ordinance and 
the general plan, and it takes away the authority of local governments 
to make legislative decisions that would otherwise be valid. At a more 
fundamental level, by requiring jurisdictions to approve a rezoning 
request even if the request conflicts with the general plan, the Ninth 
Circuit places municipalities in the position of choosing between 
complying with RLUIPA or complying with a valid state law. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Leandro also interferes with 
the distinction that the California Code of Civil Procedure draws 
between the writs of ordinary and administrative mandate. 
Municipalities are accustomed to assembling a detailed record that 
contains the basis for quasi-judicial decisions, such as decisions about 
whether to approve an application for a use permit, because such 
decisions must be challenged by the more stringent writ of 
administrative mandate.225 By contrast, legislative decisions, such as 
decisions about whether to approve a rezoning request, are subject to 
judicial review through the writ of ordinary mandate, which does not 
require the municipality to present a detailed administrative record.226 
Thus, when Sutter County was sued in federal court under RLUIPA, 
its administrative record was thorough because it was responding to a 
request for a use permit, which is a quasi-judicial act subject to 
administrative mandate. San Leandro’s record was unlikely to be as 
thoroughly developed, however, because the city was responding to a 
request for a zoning-map amendment and a zoning-text amendment, 
both of which are legislative acts and subject to the more deferential 
writ of ordinary mandate.227 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in San 
Leandro could catch municipalities off guard if they are now required 
 
 223. Id. § 65300.5 (West 2010). 
 224. Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 1990) (citations 
omitted). 
 225. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
 226. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 227. For a discussion of the differences between these writs of mandate, see supra Part 
II.B.4. 
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to articulate a compelling interest for their legislative decisions to 
deny a religious institution’s rezoning request. 
The regulation of land uses has consistently been recognized as a 
constitutional exercise of state and local governments’ reserved police 
powers.228 As discussed in Part IV, by requiring San Leandro to 
articulate a compelling reason for denying the ICFG’s rezoning 
application and simultaneously holding that San Leandro’s adherence 
to its unchallenged general plan is not a compelling interest, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision precludes San Leandro—and all other 
municipalities in the circuit—from denying rezoning requests 
regardless of the jurisdiction-wide impacts on its state-mandated, and 
otherwise-valid, general plan. This reading of RLUIPA evinces the 
same lack of congruence and proportionality that RFRA also lacked. 
Such a reading makes it seem as if RLUIPA is not “responsive to, or 
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to 
attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.”229 Under 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, RLUIPA presents the same separation of 
powers problem that RFRA presented in Boerne.230 
In the wake of San Leandro, when a religious institution applies 
to amend either the zoning map or the text of the zoning ordinance, 
municipalities are held to higher substantive and procedural 
standards than what California law requires.231 The Ninth Circuit 
could have avoided these conflicts by applying the reading suggested 
in this Note and distinguishing between the types of land-use 
entitlements at issue in Guru Nanak and San Leandro.232 
 
 228. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land 
use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.”). 
 229. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997). 
 230. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 231. This higher standard is also the heart of the problem described by Justice Stevens in his 
concurring opinion in Boerne, in which he said that RFRA “has provided the Church with a 
legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, 
as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 232.  Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit could have held that RLUIPA does not apply to any 
request that seeks to amend the zoning ordinance because, as applied to San Leandro, RLUIPA 
is an unconstitutional intrusion into substantive and procedural California law. Such a holding 
would have preserved the notion that a general plan is a local constitution and a zoning 
ordinance is a statute implementing the constitution, but it would have sacrificed all of 
RLUIPA. 
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C. Preserving RLUIPA 
Finally, this Note’s reading of RLUIPA does not render the 
statute meaningless. On the contrary, a religious land user whose 
request involves the government’s individualized assessment 
regarding whether to grant an exemption from the generally 
applicable rules would still be able to bring a cause of action under 
RLUIPA. Variances and use permits such as those at issue in Guru 
Nanak still would be within RLUIPA’s scope of application. Before 
applying RLUIPA’s strict-scrutiny and compelling-interest standards, 
courts would need to examine the nature of the requested entitlement 
and make a determination that the request necessitates an 
individualized assessment. Therefore, the statute still would protect 
applicants like Guru Nanak, whereas cities like San Leandro would 
maintain control over their ability to conduct long-range planning. 
CONCLUSION 
In San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to San 
Leandro’s denial of the ICFG’s rezoning applications pursuant to its 
interpretation of RLUIPA. Its decision to do so, however, was based 
neither on a careful analysis of whether the statute applied to the 
case, nor on a reasoned decision regarding which line of free-exercise 
cases to use. Instead, the Ninth Circuit simply applied the reasoning 
and holding of another RLUIPA case, Guru Nanak, without 
analyzing the differences between the types of land-use entitlements 
at issue in the two cases: an individualized assessment of a use permit 
in Guru Nanak and a generalized assessment of a rezoning in San 
Leandro. 
The best and most plausible construction of RLUIPA rests on 
the fundamental and legally cognizable distinction between the 
individualized assessments and generalized assessments that 
governments conduct when considering whether to approve different 
types of land-use entitlements. By its own terms, RLUIPA applies 
only when the government conducts an individualized assessment, 
such as Sutter County’s consideration of the use permits for which 
Guru Nanak applied; RLUIPA does not apply to generalized 
assessments such as the one that San Leandro conducted in response 
to the ICFG’s proposed zoning-ordinance amendments. 
The distinction between individualized and generalized 
assessments is not only consistent with the text of RLUIPA, it also 
comports with Supreme Court precedent regarding Congress’s 
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Section 5 power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause. According to 
the two lines of free-exercise cases, strict scrutiny applies when the 
government has a mechanism in place for approving exemptions to 
generally applicable laws, whereas courts use rational basis review 
when a government simply applies its generally applicable rules. In 
other words, in instances in which the government conducts an 
individualized assessment to consider whether to grant an exemption, 
such as Sutter County did in Guru Nanak, the government’s decision 
not to grant the exemption would be subject to strict scrutiny. 
Reading RLUIPA to exclude generalized assessments from its scope 
of application ensures that Congress has not altered the substance of 
the First Amendment by providing religious institutions with a 
mechanism of forcing local governments to change their generally 
applicable land-use laws. 
Finally, applying RLUIPA only to land-use assessments that are 
individualized ensures that state and local governments can continue 
to exercise their ability to control their own destiny based on the 
specific needs of their community. Such a reading of RLUIPA still 
preserves a federal cause of action for those whose religious exercise 
is substantially burdened when the government has conducted an 
individualized assessment. This reading of RLUIPA strikes the 
appropriate balance between preservation of the traditional powers 
of the states and the federal government’s interest in eliminating 
discrimination. 
